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Decentralization of Power and of Decision-Making – 
An Institutional Driver for Systems Change to 
Democracy 
Everhard Holtmann & Christian Rademacher∗ 
Abstract: »Dezentralisierung von Macht und Entscheidungsfindung – ein insti-
tutioneller Treiber für Systemwechsel zur Demokratie«. Regarding processes of 
system change towards democracy, rule of law and market economy from a 
comparative point of view, the decentralization of political institutions and of 
managing public affairs is one important system goal. Based on German experi-
ence in two times of transformation (1945/49 and 1989/90), the article reflects 
on the usefulness of transferring these (meanwhile historic) experiences as a 
specific “lesson” to the Korean peninsula. Our conclusion is threefold: First, a 
reform of the political system should combine a maintaining vertical hierarchy 
acting top down with local autonomy with either a strong or a weak set of re-
sponsibility. Second, an elite circulation of small size which incorporates coop-
erative parts of old elites seems to be useful; thereby risks of obstruction can 
be neutralized and local rationalities can be unlocked in situations of transition 
crises. Third, local self-government serves not only as a “driver” of democratiza-
tion but also for optimizing people`s demands of functional execution of public 
services. 
Keywords: Decentralization, system change, local politics, international com-
parison. 
1.  The Basic Thesis and its Historical Evidence 
Our basic thesis is threefold: Decentralized institutions of a political system, 
working on the middle level of regions and even more on the lower level of local 
jurisdictions, generally increase (a) the legitimacy, (b) the efficiency and (c) the 
common acceptance of processes transforming autocracies into democracies. 
This general assumption has not only been confirmed by the experience with the 
specific institutional transfer that was part of German Unification in 1989/90 but 
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has also been incorporated in the constitutional framing of many post-communist 
states in middle and eastern Europe. No doubt, the latter democratically ‘convert-
ed’ countries mostly adopted the type of a unitarian state. However, at the same 
time the unitarian character of the new democratic constitutions “has been mod-
erated by introducing Local Self Government offering directly elected representa-
tives and being endued with budget autonomy” (Ismayr 2004, 12).  
In fact, the degree of decentralization in these countries differs: Croatia, for 
example, “has a kind of hesitating decentralization,” lacking core responsibilities 
and finances (Kopric 2008, 41). The Constitution of the Republic of Poland guar-
antees that “the municipality (gmina) shall be the basic unit of local government,” 
and “other units of regional or local governments shall be specified by statute” 
(see Dudzinska 2008, 109). A number of western European consolidated democ-
racies have similar proposals. Of great importance is the local government for 
example in The Netherlands:  
In formal terms, the Dutch state is unitary, but ‘unity’ in this particular state 
form is not sought through hierarchical steering, but rather through mutual ad-
justment between the three levels of interconnected territorial government: na-
tional, provincial and local (Boogers 2008, 150).  
Similarly, Swedish municipalities “are self-governing political units, but they 
are also parts of the public administration”; that means “the day-to-day deci-
sions of municipal democracy are, to a large extent, already determined by the 
national government and parliament” (Wörlund 2008, 195). After the demo-
cratic revolution of 1974, Portugal “took measures to enforce local democra-
cy,” too (Pires de Almeida 2008, 234). Great Britain, on the other hand, in 
some way is a deviant case. Indeed it has a tradition of local government, but it 
“lacks any basic constitutional protection, including the right to continued 
existence” (Copus, Clark and Bottom 2008, 254).  
Despite the fact that a great variety of institutional patterns of local govern-
ment exists, oscillating between the poles of strong and weak local self-
government, we can record that adopting a decentralized level of public policy 
and administration is characteristic for countries which are proceeding on the 
path of transition from autocracy to democracy. Germany is a special case, 
insofar as the same procedure historically occurred twice: Here, local self-
government was not only a core element in the transfer of institutions from 
West to East cementing German unification in 1990 but it was also a part of the 
Western Allies’ historic attempts to bring Germany back to democracy after 
World War II. In 1946, the British Military Government of Germany, for ex-
ample, promoted an institutional reform, entitled Democratisation and Decen-
tralisation of Local and Regional Government (here following the revised 
version of February 1946). The reform goals were described as follows:  
The administration of affairs in Germany will be directed towards the decentral-
ization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. Re-
gional and local self-government will be reorganized […], and the Germans en-
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couraged to build a new political life on the widest possible democratic basis. 
The final aim will be that policy shall be initiated by the elected representatives 
of the people (VfZ 1969, 17).  
In 1946 and on the local level, representative councils should firstly be nomi-
nated and then elected, assisted by a local civil service. The latter was declared 
“nonpolitical” – not acting like puppets of state or party ideology but solely in 
line with the customary principles of a professional bureaucracy. 
At that time German domestic politicians undermined the Allied program of 
a ‘depoliticized decentralization’ and instead of it successfully revivified the 
customary German model of a strong local self-government that traditionally 
favors party politics. Despite this the occupying power as well as the democrat-
ic representatives of the defeated Germany in the Western sectors in principle 
agreed that democratization has to grow ‘from the grassroots,’ protected and 
supported by decentralized bodies of politics and administration. Being ex-
posed to the two ‘critical junctures’ during systems change in 1945/49 and in 
1989/90, the renewed local self-government both times passed its practical test 
with flying colors.  
The German path of bringing back democracy after the clash of dictatorship 
encourages us to generalize some historical findings: First, in times of crisis, 
the maintenance of state power and the allocation of public goods primarily 
have a local face. It is the local authorities who are seen as mostly responsible 
for a good running of daily life, and it is their standing or failing the test that 
strengthens or weakens the authority of the new regime on the whole. Second, 
political reforms “from below” should be combined with or embedded in re-
forms “from above”. Elsewise, lower and upper levels of policy-making run the 
risk of growing apart; so a localism may arise which could foster (ethnic or 
territorial) separatism and undermine national unity. Or factions of political 
reform and of stagnancy competing vertically could blockade each other. 
These observations underline another basic theoretical assumption: Institu-
tions do matter, not least in times of transition and system change. To manage 
the risks and uncertainties of change, it is essential for political actors to be 
backed by institutions which “frame” political action in a calculable manner – 
particularly if the institutions themselves are the object of controlled institu-
tional change (more details below). This does, nota bene, not mean that politi-
cal action is strictly determined. Rather in times of transitional uncertainties, 
actors can dispose of freedoms of action in a flexible and creative manner. This 
may explain that we witness a “neoinstitutional turn in the research of autocra-
cy” which is focusing on the institutions of the system (Backes and Kailitz 
2014, 7). However, to emphasize the importance of institutions does not mean 
to neglect the role and function of actors. 
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2.  What Does Decentralization Mean? – An Attempt to 
Clarify a Catch-All Term 
In general, we can distinguish broad and narrow concepts of decentralization. In a 
wide sense, decentralization means to delegate planning, administrative and/or 
(re)distributing responsibilities from higher to lower ranges of public or private 
institutions and organizations (cf. Rondinelli and Nellis 1986, 5). We ourselves 
prefer a narrower concept. Accordingly, decentralization contains solely self-
government, specifically a constitutionally based level of regional and/or local 
autonomy (Holtmann and Rademacher 2013). Being part of a national constitu-
tion, decentralization implies an intrastate transfer of either political and/or ad-
ministrative responsibilities, albeit with the higher-ranking reason of state often 
providing specific measures of legal supervision and of financial grants to nation-
al authorities. Germany is an example for such an ‘entangled’ federal system with 
strong local government. From a vertical point of view, the top-down delegation 
of power may be addressed to regions (middle level) and/or to local units (lower 
level). If a regional meso-level does not exist we find simply municipalization of 
public politics and services (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, 116 et seq.). 
With reference to the legal rules and the internal logics of public administra-
tion, we can distinguish three basic modes of decentralization: (1) deconcentra-
tion, (2) delegation, and (3) devolution (cf. World Bank Group 2013; UNDP 
1999). Deconcentration is considered as the weakest type, at all; here subordi-
nated agencies only execute tasks and duties, and are strictly led and controlled 
by upper level authorities (this type is characteristic for unitary centralized 
states). Second, delegation of power normally comes along with more autono-
my at the lower level; state control is confined to controlling only if he delega- 
ted tasks are executed and not in which way they are. The most comprehensive 
form of decentralization is devolution: Here, the central government transmits 
public responsibilities to quasi-autonomous units of regional or local self-
government. So the political and administrative issues of decentralization are 
overlapping (World Bank Group 2013).  
3.  Decentralization is Global – A Clue to a Worldwide Trend 
All over the world, a lot of countries are experimenting with decentralization 
(cf. Manor 1999, vii). The international research community assumes a global 
trend of decentralization (cf. Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013; Kuhlmann et al. 
2011; Denters and Rose 2005; Pollitt and Boukaert 2004; Stoker 1991). This 
trend is energized mainly by two assumptions: One the one hand, a “retreat of 
state” and its self-demolition to a “lean state” should give municipal jurisdic-
tions plenty of slack so that the latter institutions at the same time are more 
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adjusted to business management reasons (New Public Management). Here the 
intended goal of reform is to increase the performance of local public admin-
istration by implementing criteria of economic efficiency. Opposite to this 
technocratic idea of reform, decentralization has become more popular as a 
label for civic participation and voluntary self-government of public affairs. 
The general call for local self-government and the booming idea of a participat-
ing civil society has been subsumed under the topic “Good Local Governance.” 
Lately, it has now become evident that there exists a strong tie between decen-
tralization and democratization. 
4.  How Can We Explain the Long-Standing Viability of 
Local Self-Government? 
However, the long-living narrative of democracy is not the only reason why 
local self-government has proved itself viable as an institutional prerequisite of 
“blueprints” of systems change from autocracy towards a state of law and de-
mocracy. We can explain this remarkable endurance (or resurrection) of local 
self-government by a bundle of persisting societal factors, of the charisma of 
democratic norms and of evident, politically functional considerations. Though 
prima facie empirically derived from the German case study, it has a lot in its 
favor of classifying these factors as universalized phenomena. In the following, 
we enumerate some relevant points: 
First, we should keep in mind the time-transcending (and probably univer-
sally existing) “nature” of local communities: All over the world, people are 
living, thinking, feeling and acting within socio-spatial relations which are 
personal, familiar and of a size easy to survey. It is the local surroundings that 
make family, neighborhood, peer groups or associational activities identifiable. 
Individual demands and personal interests are knowable as well. The “density, 
nearness, and intensity” (Wehling 1986, 227) of social relations is a character-
istic feature of local communities. In turn, this is a precondition for solidarity 
but, no doubt, also a source for latent or open social conflicts. In any event, the 
local social community and its political jurisdiction, the latter being the legally 
institutionalized elements of local government, obviously are more closely 
nested than is the case on the upper levels of regions or national state – espe-
cially given that there exists a local self-government which deserves this name. 
If this is the case, then the “genes” of social community may evaporate ener-
gies for local politics: People can develop and train subjective political compe-
tence (“By participating we are ruling ourselves”). 
Second: Keeping in mind these specific social structures of local living envi-
ronments which can be used in favor of local politics, three additional matters 
of fact constituting the enduring importance of local administration and politics 
in modern democracies become more understandable: (a) the participatory idea 
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of “democracy from the grassroots” as a normative principle and as political 
practice; not randomly is the constitutional framework of EU based on the 
principle of subsidiarity (“what can be done by lower levels, should be done by 
those”) – (b) the vertical share of powers inside a multi-level system, by dele-
gating influence and responsibilities to various layers of the political system – 
and (c) the relatively high level of subjectively perceived importance of local 
public institutions and of general trust in them.  
As in other cases of the “strong type” of local government (cf. Wollmann 
2002) in the world, the German case confirms these matters of fact mentioned 
above as well as showing their long-term viability. Concerning grassroots 
democracy, in Germany elected local representatives are programming and 
controlling general and specific decisions of their municipalities. Moreover, 
complementary instruments of direct democracy have meanwhile been installed 
for the election of mayors and for plebiscites on factual local issues. In fact, 
German municipalities have substantial responsibilities of “original” self-
governance (as will be described later in this article).  
As to power sharing within an ‘intertwined’ multi-level system, the German 
model resembles a paternoster lift: In addition to their original rights of self-
government, local jurisdictions are executing delegated tasks and distributing 
financial benefits on behalf of the state. The reason why these public duties are 
transferred top down by national and regional authorities is twofold: On the one 
hand the polity can make profit of the above mentioned familiarity of local 
actors and local offices with urban problems. On the other hand otherwise state 
capacities could be overloaded. Conversely, German municipalities are embed-
ded in a vertical multi-stage construction of state supervision operated by 
means of legal control and guidance.  
The “nested political outcome” within the German multi-level system is 
perceived as a confluence of national, regional and local politics. This enforces 
a common idea that “all politics is local” (and, vice versa, that local incidents 
are a mirror of national politics). Most public affairs (except, for example, 
foreign policy) and public spending are omnipresent on local grounds, people 
have a considerably high esteem of the local government’s importance, as 
empirical surveys repeatedly have shown. In 2008, for example, one third of 
West and East Germans were convinced of regional and local levels mostly 
influencing daily life; while 47 and 46 percent respectively estimated the na-
tional level to be most important (Eurobarometer 307, 2009). In the same year, 
67 percent declared local government institution’s decision as “important” or 
“very important” for their daily life. This high esteem was only topped by a 77 
percent preference for the Bundestag (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009). 
However, not only the normative weight of the ideal of “basic democracy” 
and of the wide-spread popular esteem of local institutions can legitimize local 
self-government. Additionally, a decentralized administration of politics as 
such is functionally advantageous. As already outlined above, the rules and 
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practices of shared power running the multi-level-system of German “coopera-
tive federalism” are based on the expectation of a more efficient administration 
and politics. For this reason, “decentralization” ties together the elementary 
democratic desire for political participation and the “technocratic” argument of 
better problem solving.  
The “technocratic” assumption is: Decentralized political decision-making is 
able to optimize its output by “creaming off” the knowledge and personal com-
petence of those actors who are nearer to the problems below. Since the early 
1970s German political scientists have pled for making accessible “local ra-
tionalities” (Naschold 1972) in favor of improving decision making processes. 
The argument is: Solutions will be better if contextual knowledge and motiva-
tion of actors and experts close to problems are included. Such contextual 
knowledge allows a practical view on local problems, and it is reloading itself 
as part of the described social webs of local communities. Thus, the result 
hoped for is not only stabilizing democracy on lower levels of the political 
system but creates also an “increasing efficiency of the organization as a 
whole” (ibid., 89). This double effect is quite important in times of systems 
change on the one hand, old state authorities may collapse while on the other 
hand a transitional justice will be impelled. It depends on intimate and authen-
tic knowledge of individual incrimination of members of the old elites if transi-
tional justice deserves its name.  
To support this thesis of local rationality, we refer to the fact that in Germa-
ny the standardized text of a law being applied on local grounds normally is 
adapted to concrete local problems (cf. Bogumil 2001, 17) due to the existence 
of a “working” local self-government. This general advantage of decentralized 
administration and policy-making proved true during the transition process in 
East Germany and especially in the early years of reunification. Concerning the 
sector of housing policy, for example, some legal norms transferred from West 
to East turned out not to fit well for the specific needs of East German cities. 
Nevertheless, solutions have been found: As result of informal negotiations, 
members of both regional and urban administrations came to flexible agree-
ments by adapting inadequate aid programs to deviant domestic demands, 
sometimes yielding discretionary powers to the extreme (cf. Meisel 1997, 
1998). 
To summarize so far: Decentralization in the described sense refers to a model 
of institutionalized self-government giving space for substantial local (and/or 
regional) autonomy. Its remarkable viability as political program along with real 
practice is the result of a specific merger of democracy and efficiency. On the one 
hand, decentralized politics better facilitates the consideration of citizens’ needs, 
as well as stimulating civic participation, and promoting self-determination of 
smaller communities whose peculiarity and identity can be preserved easier 
(Benz 2003, 6). Furthermore, local self-government with guaranteed local auto- 
nomy is not only derived from mere democratic principles but it is also esteemed 
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for its complementary functions as a decentralized part of the entire political 
system. Citing the political scientist Joachim Jens Hesse, in Germany since the 
1980s local institutions have become more and more important “as down-
streamed agents of implementation, pooling and integration” in support of the 
state (1986, 25). Whereas state politics follows the aims of central political lead-
ership, focused on identifying and solving general problems, a set of tasks of 
performative politics is delegated to local authorities (ibid.). 
5.  The Systemic Functions of Local Self-Government in 
Germany 
The cooperation of national, regional and local politics within the multi-level 
system of Germany draws attention to the systemic functions of local self-
government. As already outlined, the function of German local self-
government is closely linked to its decentralized tasks and responsibilities. 
Neither the national ministries and other upper state executive boards nor the 
regional governments of the Länder can dispose of a local administrative body 
of their own. Therefore, state agencies of Bund and Länder have to revert to 
local institutions and urban civil services in order to execute the law and to 
implement benefits and programs. This is the reason why, as a rule of thumb, 
German municipalities (and counties, Kreise) transact approximately two thirds 
of the entire public spending. 
Article 28, clause 2 of German Basic Law constitutes a guarantee of the insti-
tution of local self-government. Seven main responsibilities are assigned exclu-
sively to municipalities. These granted sovereignties are: (1) a territorial respon-
sibility (Gebietshoheit), that is, the general authorization to pass legal acts within 
their own boundaries; (2) a norm building task (Satzungshoheit), limited by the 
local unit’s own territory; for example, development plans, scales of charges or 
budgetary planning can be subsumed under this task; (3) an organizational com-
petence (Organisationshoheit), offering municipalities the right to build up a 
local body of administration; (4) a financial sovereignty (Finanzhoheit), enabling 
an autonomous budgetary policy; (5) a personal competence (Personalhoheit), 
including the right to engage, to dismiss, to promote and to employ the personnel 
of local civil service; (6) a planning competence (Planungshoheit), which makes 
it possible to plan about the local territory autonomously, (7) a task competence 
(Aufgabenhoheit), that means local jurisdiction can decide what to do by priority 
(Walter-Rogg, Kunz and Gabriel 2005, 414 et seq.). Most important is the finan-
cial sovereignty because it is the permit for operating the amount of income and 
expenditure autonomously, thereby laying the financial ground for the autono-
mous performance of public tasks and services. 
The real degree of local autonomy in Germany depends on whether the tasks 
are declared to be genuine self-government, compulsory or optional (freiwillige 
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and pflichtige Selbstverwaltung), or to be delegated tasks of state (staatliche 
Auftragsangelegenheiten). Depending on the divergent kind of duty, the range 
of legal or material controlling on the part of higher state agencies also differs. 
But notwithstanding the existing formal rights of control from above, state 
politics is reliant on a closing on ranks, that is to say joint implementation 
arrangements (Vollzugskonsensus) with local jurisdictions. The basic consensus 
underlying the German multi-level-system is vertical intertwining and coopera-
tion between national, federal and local politics and administration instead of 
“fencing off” and separation.  
The German model of a decentralized completion of managing public affairs 
has its historical roots in the Prussian municipal reforms of 1808. Subsequently 
a path dependency of this model has been shaped out, albeit twice interrupted 
by hierarchical and incapacitating attacks that disempowered local self-
government in times of national socialist dictatorship between 1935 and 1945 
and during the communist GDR-regime from 1949 to 1990. Local self-
government was reinstalled in West Germany after 1945 and in East Germany 
since 1990. The resilience is quite remarkable. It has its origin in the institu-
tions’ ‘twin set function’, that is to say equally fostering democratization and 
optimizing a down-to-earth problem solving as well. 
6.  Local Self-Government as Part of the Transfer of 
Institutions to East Germany in the Period of System 
Change and Reunification 1989/90 – Dimensions and 
Structure-Building Effects 
At late the inner collapse of the autocratic system of GDR revealed the lack of 
democratic substance on local grounds. However, there was no alternative but 
to cover the ongoing demand on sufficient municipal delivery of public ser-
vices. From the West German federal government’s point of view, initiatives to 
rebuild an efficient public administration in East Germany were confronted 
with enormous difficulties. Citing an official document of July 1991, condi-
tions were “partly disastrous”, that means they were rather reinforcing transi-
tional crisis than attenuating it. “Traditional deficits of existing bureaucratic 
bodies continue to be a considerable barrier against establishing equal condi-
tions of life in the whole country” (Dt. Bundestag, Drucksache 12/916). There-
fore, the federal government, the “old” Länder and a lot of West German local 
jurisdictions started a program for supporting a speedy recovery of an efficient 
public administration in the “new” Länder and their municipalities.  
The treaty of unification offered a legal basis for this level of spontaneous 
administrative partnership. So anticipating the official date of united Germany, 
a considerable transfer of personnel and administrative know-how from West 
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to East took place. In order to coordinate the personal demands for roundabout 
7,500 East German municipalities, the ministry of the interior and the leading 
organizations of local government installed a so called purse for personnel at 
Berlin. Until the middle of 1991, thousands of West German civil servants 
were sent by their home town offices for assisting at the renewal of local ad-
ministration in East Germany. Mostly, this personal and technical assistance 
got its initial spark out of more than 700 towns and county East-West partner-
ships. All East German towns with more than 40,000 inhabitants, as well as all 
190 East German counties, belonged to this cross-border network of local co-
operation which had already existed in times of GDR (for details, ibid.).  
Special in-service training courses were offered to East German civil servants 
as part of the partnership program. Personal assistance of West German munici-
palities also included the transfer of professional knowledge for handling local 
affairs, either often by technical advice at place or from a distance. So “depu-
tized” decisions were prepared and worked out, concerning, for instance, docu-
ments of approval or the audit of legal questions and problems (ibid.).  
7.  Structural Challenges and Problems of Accommoda-
tion in Times of System Change – A “Lesson” of 
German Experiences 
Bringing together two antagonistic state cultures was an enormous challenge. 
Citing the expert Klaus König, in the beginning of unification of East and West 
Germany “two fundamentally different types of civil service were standing 
opposite to each other: on the one side the traditional civil service with tenure, 
and on the other side an administration of Marxist-Leninist cadre type” 
(Koenig 1992, 549). Thus, the main characteristics of the real-socialist type of 
public administration could be described as follows: this type combined “an 
instrumental doctrine of state for managing public affairs, a cadre-based per-
sonnel, democratic centralism as guideline of organization and transmitting 
party’s intention into current administration” (Koenig 1995, 82). The person-
nel’s basic qualification requirement was ideological aptitude. Though since 
the 1960s professional expertise had become more important (cf. Best et al. 
2012), the “auto-dynamics of professionalism” (Koenig) should be constrained 
by the single party’s instructions. “Modes of recruitment and career aimed at 
system loyalty and partisanship” (Koenig 1992, 550). 
Under these circumstances, East Germany’s public sector “had to be rede-
fined totally” (ibid., 552). Hereby, structural rebuilding and conversion of 
personnel were linked closely. The local sphere was a specific object of reform, 
too, because in times of GDR the municipalities had served as “local agencies 
of state” and lacked any autonomy. No doubt, the challenges of transformation 
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were enormous. Transformation of structure and spirit meant, for example, that 
“a county administration has to be repurposed from a mere state subordinate 
into an agency of local self-government. And, furthermore, the duties belong-
ing had to be done” (ibid.).  
The unification treaty of 1990 prepared the path for public reforms so that 
all officials of East German administration branches, if the latter were not 
liquidated as institutions, maintained their jobs. This decision came about on 
behalf of securing continuity of administration and of including the old person-
nel’s collective interest as well. So much more urgently aroused the question of 
“how to incorporate members of the old cadres into a conventional system of 
administration which is based on principles of professional qualification and 
output, despite the existing influence of party politics” (ibid., 555).  
There were two factors that facilitated responding to this challenge. First, 
transformation in general is characterized by “specific similarities between the 
former and the new system” (ibid., 552). In the case of Germany, like Klaus 
Koenig pointed out, the bureaucratic state’s historical heritage was a matter of 
weight as well as the past of an industrialized economy. Besides this, the institu-
tional change was based on a “formal-legal revolution,” continuing practices and 
loyalties of the traditional pattern of bureaucracy: “State monopoly for making 
law and executing it has not been infringed. The real socialism has been dis-
charged peacefully by new constitutional rules, laws and regulations” (ibid.). 
Second, a complete replacement of elites did not really take place (cf. Best and 
Vogel 2012, 2016, in this HSR Forum). For the moment, the great bulk of GDR 
cadre personnel remained untouched by the regime transformation from dictator-
ship to democracy. One result of this “soft” elite circulation – at least in the sec-
ond and third range – was that the affected personnel got a chance of “rational 
adaptation”. And in fact, they often used this chance. The term “adaptation” 
reflects a mode of reaction which in 1945 US-American social scientists had in 
mind, looking forward on presumed attitudes of German people after the end of 
the War. Then the capability of “rational adaptation” has been outlined as “a 
fundamental component of social behavior” in times of regime displacement.  
Following this theoretical approach, the ‘silent’ adaptation of at least some 
parts of the old positional elites to the new system goals is a decisive psycho-
logical prerequisite for running a controlled institutional change successfully 
(American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 1945, 397 et seq.). In short words: In 
order to control blockade potentials of the old “vested interests” inside remain-
ing institutions and to replace old webs of group solidarity, it is advisable to 
win a part of the old personnel as auxiliaries of change. Getting so? ‘Allies’ 
within the social system itself by satisfying their special interests, a window is 
open “for a sufficient degree of conformity on the part of a sufficient proportion 
of the relevant population” (ibid., 398 et seq.). It is exactly this conformity 
which is much-needed, because a successful system change depends on a  
cooperative attitude of at least some parts of the old elites. 
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A controlled institutional change is also important on the grounds of local 
government. In precarious times of transition the public services have to be 
ensured here. Not referring to this “recipe” of controlled institutional change 
explicitly, the democratic renewal of local government and administration in 
Germany followed this path, after 1945 in the Western half of the country as 
well as during the start-up of democracy since 1990 in East Germany. Indeed, a 
change of leadership in the first-line of local management often occurred. But 
the newly appointed personnel of upper range (burgomasters, district chief 
executives, heads of departments, chief officers) often had a professional back-
ground, (that is) distant from administration and politics; partly old mayors 
were reelected, albeit under non-party label (Daeumer 1997). Approximately 
each third or fourth of these reelected mayors holding the same office already 
in GDR got approved in free elections (Wollmann 1997, 277).  
On the whole, the change of local elites was “in no way complete”; in lower 
ranges one can observe “continuity to a large extent” (Wollmann and Jaedicke 
1995, 106; Daeumer 1997, 21, 241). Even more, the corridor of local institutional 
change, oscillating between brake and continuity, opened the floor to revalue 
endogenous East German views and experiences seeping into the new body of 
decentralized institutions (Wollmann 1996, 51; Wollmann et al. 1997, 12). 
8.  The Institution of Local Self-Government: An Export 
Article for a Decentralized Version of System Change? 
With regard to a discussed application of the German case and its specific 
experience with system change and unification, one question arises: Does it 
make sense to export the German model of local self-government – a strong 
type, above all – like a virtual scenario for a Korea transmuting itself into tran-
sition country? – The answer is: Yes, in principle, because the concept leaves 
space for graduations. In other words: It is possible to hold a balance between 
the two poles of centralistic hierarchy and decentralized local power in differ-
ent ways, due to (differing) political preferences and national traditions. Even if 
one does not copy the complete set of municipal sovereignties as if it was actu-
ally granted in Germany, a decentralized composition of public affairs might 
run. We can also imagine a constellation of “weak self-government” which is 
similar to the present constitutional situation in the Republic of South Korea, 
conceding rather limited autonomous functions and financial sources for local 
authorities (Koellner, Flamm and Olbrich 2015, 105-8). Furthermore, a less 
autonomous municipal power like this could be the starting point for moving 
towards more decentralization. 
The following figure shows the “puzzle” for how to combine (or to exclude) 
the elements of total seven local rights and municipal sovereignties. In contrast 
to the case of Germany, one could abstain, for example, from the norm building 
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and/or organizational competence, and/or transferring top-down only a limited 
financial responsibility. If doing so, the result will be a pattern of local admin-
istration serving more as a long arm of state politics. However, a construction 
like this is also compatible with a democratic system. But it will less exploit the 
potential resources of local democracy. 
Figure 1: The “Puzzle” for a Strong or Weak Local Self-Government 
 
Source: E. Holtmann (2015), IPSA World Conference on North Korean Studies. 
 
Whether it be a “strong” or “weak” institutional pattern, tensions and conflicts 
between upper and lower levels will arise in Germany, for example, on and off 
conflicts arise between local assembly’s decisions and legal supervision by 
state agencies. Another critical subject is the financial dependency of munici-
palities being led by the “golden reins” of state benefits and subsidy programs.  
Disregarding such typical inherent tensions and political infight (and fading 
out for a moment the completely hierarchical masque of the North Korean 
dictatorship): Is there any point of contact for bringing forward decentralization 
in the contemporary political system of South Korea? 
Anyway, decentralization and local autonomy is a topic of current South 
Korean political and scientific debates on administration reform (Rowan 2002; 
Choi, Choe and Kim 2013). Korea seems to lack a historical legacy of decen-
tralized administration and local self-government. In fact, local representatives 
and some scientists have criticized central government repeatedly for refusing 
to transfer responsibilities to the bottom of politics (Choi, Choe and Kim 2013, 
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31). However, the Republic of South Korea cannot elude the international trend 
of decentralization completely. In 1999, a committee for the devolution of 
governmental tasks has been established (meanwhile renamed Presidential 
Commission for Decentralization/PCD). Furthermore, in 2004 a special law 
concerning the promotion of decentralization was enacted (ibid.). 
Accordingly, the matter of decentralization and devolution is defined as part 
of central state’s top-down initiative. Following an internal PCD paper of De-
cember 2011, more than 3000 public tasks were provided to be executed decen-
trally; at the same time more than 55 percent have been brought en route, most 
of them in 2004 and 2005 (ibid., 32).  
Nevertheless, the pace of reform moved slowly. There are several reasons 
why: Central agencies of state argue that at first local jurisdictions should im-
prove their administrative skills in order to manage the process of decentraliza-
tion efficiently. Vice versa, local governments suspect that upper authorities are 
hesitant to transfer responsibilities top down because they fear a loss of power 
(ibid., 33).  
The history of German state-building, and especially the experience of sys-
tem change and unification in 1989/1990, proves that a synchrony of both 
centralizing and decentralizing governance of public affairs can have fruitful 
effects. Consequently, Korean scientists also demand a synchronous process of 
decentralization of responsibilities and of building up local administrative 
capacities (Choi, Choe and Kim 2013, 33).  
Maybe, in the hypothetical case of a Korean unification a strategy and practice 
might be helpful similar to the “benevolent despotism”, by which after 1945 the 
British Military Government had accompanied West Germans attempts to recov-
er the democratic path of local self-government. The strategic goal is the same 
now as then, which is to assist top down the process of democratization and to 
install a professional, efficient and law-abiding local bureaucracy.  
9.  A Blueprint for Korea? – Some Possible “Lessons” of 
the German Path of Decentralization from a 
Comparative Point of View 
Apparently, national conditions differ. The cultural context is not always the 
same. Summarizing the remarks lined out above, we dare to shape some gen-
eralizations derived from the German experiences with system change and 
unification: 
1) A pattern of system change which combines the perspective of a “reform 
from above” with elements of a “reform from below” proves to be rather 
successful. Local self-government and administration should be embedded 
in a system of state control, (legal) supervision and financial subsidies. On 
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the other hand, a vertical hierarchy acting top down should be complement-
ed by the autonomy of either a strong or a weak set of responsibilities on the 
local level. 
2) An elite circulation of small size seems to be useful, at least on the local 
level of politics and administration. A ‘soft’ staffing policy like this can cre-
ate a specific win-win-situation either for adaptable old cadres or for pro-
moting the new norms and rules. So, potential risks of obstruction and 
blockade are neutralized, and local rationalities can be made useful for 
managing transition crises better. 
3) Local self-government which deserves this name serves as a “driver” of 
democratization as well as for optimizing demands of functional execution 
of public services. The latter claim is also important for legitimizing the new 
political order on the part of ordinary people. 
4) Making use of local peculiarities and innovative resources, local self-
government opens the floor for best municipal. 
5) Offering opportunities of local self-government, the personal identification 
with local units can be strengthened. Furthermore, local identity may be an 
incentive to stay as a local resident, despite the fact that the alternatives of 
flight from the land and out migration will probably be attractive for many 
people beyond the former boundary in times of transformation. 
6) A considerable advantage of local self-government is its flexible institution-
al setting. This setting can serve as a stakeholder for political reform. It is 
possible to arrange the components of sovereignty in the way of a “puzzle” 
of institution building, accommodated to divergent cultural traditions and 
actual demands.  
7) Last but not least: In times of system change, severe uncertainties are grow-
ing on the part of ordinary people. Local self-government can provide for 
some stability in this critical period between the systems if the new authori-
ties are reverting to contextual knowledge and professional skills of local 
“trustees.” 
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